The Cuban Missile Crisis
Thirteen Days and the Closest Approach to Nuclear War
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The crisis unfolded over thirteen days of intense negotiations and military preparations. ExComm debated responses including invasion, bombing raids, and naval quarantine. Kennedy chose a naval blockade, which he called a "quarantine" to avoid immediate war. The Soviet Union secretly deployed nuclear weapons to Cuba while American forces reached DEFCON 2 alert level.
Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged letters through diplomatic channels. Secret negotiations took place in Moscow and Washington. A close call occurred aboard the Soviet submarine B-59 when crew nearly launched a nuclear torpedo. The crisis ended when the Soviets agreed to remove missiles from Cuba in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.
Anyone interested in Cold War diplomacy or nuclear brinkmanship will find this detailed account compelling.
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The Cuban government saw US imperialism as the main reason for the island’s problems. The United States had supported the military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, who ruled Cuba until 1958, providing weapons, money, and backing to keep that regime in power. Many Cubans were fed up with the serious economic and social issues caused by US control. The new Cuban government understood that something had to change to end the chaos and unfairness of life under a US-dominated system. They also rejected the demands made by the US government, which they viewed as part of a hostile response to their own policies.
After World War II ended and the Cold War began, the United States started pushing private business as a way to protect its interests abroad. The US government grew worried about the spread of communism.
In December 1959, while Dwight Eisenhower was still president, the CIA began planning an attack on Cuba. Under the direction of CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, the agency recruited people on the island to carry out sabotage and terrorism. When John F. Kennedy took office, he approved the plan, and in April 1961, the U.S. launched the Bay of Pigs Invasion using CIA-trained Cuban exiles. The operation failed completely, and the U.S. government’s involvement became public before it even started. The embarrassment was significant for Kennedy, who later recalled former President Eisenhower telling him, “the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do.”
After the failed invasion, the U.S. significantly escalated its support of terrorism against Cuba. Starting in late 1961, the military and CIA led a widespread campaign of attacks on both civilian and military targets. These actions killed many civilians. The U.S. armed, trained, and funded terrorists—mostly Cuban exiles—and directed operations from U.S. territory. In January 1962, U.S. Air Force General Edward Lansdale outlined plans in a secret report to Kennedy and others involved with Operation Mongoose. CIA agents, called "pathfinders," were to infiltrate Cuba to carry out sabotage and broadcasts. By February, the U.S. had imposed an embargo, and Lansdale presented a 26-page timetable for overthrowing the government, setting guerrilla operations for August and September, with hopes of open revolt by early October.
The Soviet Union’s decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba was closely tied to the ongoing campaign of terrorism and the real threat of a U.S. invasion. The U.S. government was aware of this, as reported in a National Intelligence Estimate given to the president. That estimate made clear that the danger of an invasion was a major reason behind the increased Soviet military presence in Cuba. The Cuban government, facing similar threats, agreed to accept these missiles. The connection between the invasion threat and the missile deployment played a central role in shaping the events that followed.
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When Kennedy campaigned for president in 1960, he made claims about a "missile gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union. The reality was different: at that time, the U.S. actually held a growing advantage. By 1961, the Soviets possessed only four R-7 Semyorka intercontinental ballistic missiles. Some intelligence reports by October 1962 suggested that number had risen to 75.
The United States had 170 intercontinental ballistic missiles and was rapidly expanding that number. It also possessed eight George Washington- and Ethan Allen-class submarines, each capable of launching 16 Polaris missiles with a range of 2,500 nautical miles. Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev claimed the Soviets were building missiles “like sausages,” but in reality, their missile capabilities fell far short of that boast. The USSR had about 700 medium-range ballistic missiles, though they were unreliable and inaccurate. The U.S. held a major edge in total nuclear warheads—27,000 compared to the Soviets’ 3,600—and in the technology needed for precise delivery. The U.S. also led in missile defense, naval power, and air strength. The Soviets did have a two-to-one advantage in conventional ground forces, especially in tanks and field guns located in Europe.
Khrushchev believed Kennedy was weak, a view reinforced by the President's response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, especially when East Germany built the Berlin Wall to stop citizens from fleeing to the West. The lackluster Bay of Pigs invasion further convinced Khrushchev that Kennedy was indecisive. One Soviet aide described him as “too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations... too intelligent and too weak.” After the crisis, Khrushchev told Soviet officials, “I know for certain that Kennedy doesn't have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge.” He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy “would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree.”
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In May 1962, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev made a bold decision to place intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, aiming to balance the U.S.'s growing advantage in strategic weapons. At the time, the U.S. had a clear edge, with what was seen as a “splendid first strike” capability that left the Soviet Union at a serious disadvantage. The Soviets only had 20 ICBMs ready to hit the U.S. from within their own borders, but those missiles were unreliable and inaccurate. A newer, more effective generation wouldn’t be ready until after 1965. Khrushchev’s move came despite concerns from the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, Alexandr Ivanovich Alexeyev, who doubted that Fidel Castro would agree to host the weapons.
In 1962, the Soviet Union’s nuclear strategy emphasized medium and intermediate-range missiles rather than intercontinental ballistic missiles. These could hit American allies and most of Alaska, but not the continental United States. As Graham Allison pointed out, the Soviets couldn’t fix the nuclear imbalance by placing new ICBMs on their own soil. Facing threats in 1962, 1963, and 1964, they had few options. One was relocating existing weapons to sites from which they could reach American targets.
Khrushchev had another motive for placing missiles in Cuba: he wanted to use them as leverage to bring West Berlin under Soviet influence. At the time, the western powers—America, Britain, and France—controlled a section of Berlin, which the Soviets saw as a direct threat to East Germany. For Khrushchev, Berlin was the central front of the Cold War. He believed that if the U.S. did nothing about the Cuban missiles, he could pressure the West out of Berlin by threatening military action there. If the U.S. tried to negotiate after discovering the missiles, Khrushchev could demand a trade—exchanging the missiles for control of West Berlin. As Kennedy recognized: "The advantage is, from Khrushchev's point of view, he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it."
From the standpoint of both the Soviet Union and Cuba, the United States appeared determined to invade or strengthen its presence in Cuba. The U.S. had tried to oust Cuba from the Organization of American States, carried out violent terrorist attacks against Cuban civilians, imposed economic sanctions, and made a previous attempt to invade the island. These actions led Cuban leaders to believe America was trying to overrun their country. In response, the USSR decided to place missiles in Cuba, which would protect the island from attack and ensure its loyalty to the Socialist Bloc.
The United States had long considered the possibility of launching nuclear weapons from Turkey against the Soviet Union, a move that could have struck before the Soviets were ready to respond. In response, the Soviets placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, creating what was known as a balance of mutual assured destruction. This meant that if the U.S. initiated a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviets would be able to retaliate with their own nuclear strike against the U.S.
After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Soviet Union became Cuba's ally. The USSR positioned nuclear missiles there not only to support the Cuban people, who saw the United States as a threat, but also to strengthen their alliance. According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were "aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire".
In a 2002 interview with National Public Radio, historian and Kennedy adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. said that Fidel Castro did not want Soviet missiles placed in Cuba, but Nikita Khrushchev convinced him to agree. Castro was uneasy about the plan, yet the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution ultimately endorsed it. They did so for two reasons: to defend Cuba from a possible U.S. attack and to support the Soviet Union.
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In early 1962, Soviet military and missile construction specialists joined an agricultural delegation in Havana, where they met with Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro. One report says the Cuban leadership expected a U.S. invasion and welcomed the idea of placing nuclear missiles on the island. Another source indicates that while Castro initially resisted appearing as a Soviet puppet, he was convinced the missiles would annoy the United States and benefit the socialist cause. The plan involved deploying short-range tactical weapons with a 40-kilometer range—designed only for use against naval targets—and meant to offer a "nuclear umbrella" for defending Cuba.
In May, Khrushchev and Castro decided to secretly deploy strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev believed a U.S. invasion of Cuba was likely and that losing the island would severely damage communist influence, especially in Latin America. He stated he wanted to confront the Americans "with more than words... the logical answer was missiles." To keep the plan hidden, the Soviets wrote everything by hand. The operation, named Anadyr, received approval from Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky on July 4 and from Khrushchev himself on July 7.
Operation Anadyr was shrouded in secrecy, using a tactic called "maskirovka" to hide its true purpose. The Soviets planned the missile deployment with extreme care, keeping the mission's details from nearly everyone involved. Troops were misled, told they were heading to a cold area and given winter gear like ski boots and parkas. Only a select few knew what was really happening. The operation’s success depended on deception, ensuring no one understood the real goal until it was too late.
In July, specialists in missile construction arrived under false identities, posing as machine operators and agricultural workers. A total of 43,000 foreign troops would eventually be sent to Cuba. Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergey Biryuzov, who led the Soviet Rocket Forces, visited Cuba with a survey team. He told Khrushchev the missiles could be hidden and disguised by palm trees. The troops came heavily unprepared for the tropical climate, which would make many of their weapons and pieces of equipment fail. In the early days of setting up the missiles, soldiers reported fuse failures, corrosion, oil shortages, and generator outages.
By August 1962, U.S. intelligence had begun spotting Soviet aircraft in Cuba, including MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 bombers. Then U-2 spy planes revealed eight locations with S-75 Dvina surface-to-air missile sites. CIA director John A. McCone suspected the missiles were meant to protect Soviet ballistic missiles aimed at America. He wrote a memo to President Kennedy on August 10, guessing that the Soviets were preparing to place such missiles in Cuba. Later that month, Che Guevara traveled to the Soviet Union to finalize the missile agreement. The CIA monitored his trip closely. While there, he argued with Khrushchev to make the deal public, but Khrushchev insisted on secrecy and promised support if the U.S. discovered the missiles. By the time Guevara reached Cuba, U-2 planes had already spotted Soviet troops stationed there.
With Congressional elections coming up in November, the crisis grew entangled in American politics. On August 31, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York) told the Senate the Soviet Union was "in all probability" building a missile base in Cuba. He accused the Kennedy administration of hiding this threat from the public, igniting debate. Keating may have gotten his information from Clare Boothe Luce, a former congresswoman and ambassador, who received it from Cuban exiles. A later source for his claims could have been the West German ambassador to Cuba, who learned from inside dissidents that Soviet troops had entered Cuba in early August and were likely working on or near a missile site. He shared this with Keating during a trip to Washington in early October. Meanwhile, Air Force General Curtis LeMay gave Kennedy a plan for bombing Cuba before invasion, while U.S. spy flights and minor military actions from Guantanamo Bay drew ongoing complaints from Cuban officials in Washington.
The first batch of Soviet R-12 missiles landed on the night of September 8, with a second shipment following on September 16. These were medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead. The R-12 was a single-stage, road-transportable missile fueled by storable liquid propellant, designed to launch from the surface. It could deliver a megaton-class nuclear weapon. The Soviets were setting up nine sites in total: six for the R-12s, known to NATO as the SS-4 Sandal, with a range of about 2,000 kilometers, and three for the R-14 intermediate-range missiles, designated SS-5 Skean, with a reach of up to 4,500 kilometers.
On 7 October, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado addressed the UN General Assembly. He said that if Cuba was attacked, they would defend themselves. He repeated that they had sufficient means for defense. He added that they did indeed have what he called “inevitable weapons,” weapons they would have preferred not to acquire and do not wish to employ.
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The United States had been flying U-2 spy planes over Cuba since the Bay of Pigs invasion. Then on August 30th, a U-2 from the Strategic Air Command mistakenly flew over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Union, causing a protest and an apology from the U.S. Nine days later, a Taiwanese U-2 was shot down over China by a Soviet surface-to-air missile. That made U.S. officials nervous about possible downing of CIA U-2s over Cuba. At a meeting on September 10th with the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy decided to stop U-2 flights over Cuba. For the next five weeks, there was no U-2 coverage of the island, a gap later called the “Photo Gap.” The U.S. tried using a Corona satellite, but cloudy weather on October 1st blocked the view. At the end of September, Navy planes spotted a Soviet ship with crates that looked like jet bomber parts.
In September 1962, analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency noticed that missile sites being built in Cuba looked like those the Soviet Union used to protect their own ICBM bases. The DIA pushed for U-2 spy planes to fly over Cuba again. These flights had been done by the CIA before, but now the Air Force was taking over because of pressure from the Defense Department. This change came after a CIA U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960. At that time, people thought it would be easier to explain if another U-2 went down, this time flown by the Air Force, since that would seem like a normal military mission rather than a covert CIA operation.
When reconnaissance flights were allowed again on October 9, 1962, bad weather kept them from taking off. The United States got the first clear photographic proof of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 14, 1962. A U-2 plane flown by Major Richard Heyser captured 928 photos along a route chosen by analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency. The images showed an SS-4 missile site under construction at San Cristóbal, in what was then Pinar del Río Province, and is now part of Artemisa Province.
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On October 15th, 1962, analysts at the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center reviewed U-2 spy photos and spotted what looked like medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. The identification was helped by information from a Soviet double agent named Oleg Penkovsky, who worked for the CIA and MI6. Though Penkovsky didn’t directly report on missile sites in Cuba, his prior knowledge of Soviet missile units helped the analysts recognize the weapons in the photographs.
That evening, the CIA informed the Department of State, and at 8:30 pm EDT, Bundy decided to wait until the next morning to inform the President. McNamara was briefed at midnight. The following morning, Bundy showed Kennedy the U-2 photographs and walked him through the CIA’s analysis of the images. At 6:30 pm EDT, Kennedy called together the nine members of the National Security Council and five other senior advisers to form what he later named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or EXCOMM. He did not tell them that he had tape-recorded their meeting, and Sheldon M. Stern, who led the Kennedy library, transcribed some of the proceedings.
On 16 October, President Kennedy informed his Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, that he was convinced the Soviets were installing missiles in Cuba and that this represented a serious threat. Robert Kennedy then reached out to the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to convey his “concern about what was happening.” Dobrynin responded on behalf of Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev, who told President Kennedy that no ground-to-ground missiles or offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba. Khrushchev also stated that the Soviet Union had no intention of “disrupting the relationship of our two countries,” despite the photographic proof President Kennedy had reviewed.
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When the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, it became clear the US had no prepared response. The situation caught them off guard, as they had never anticipated such a move. A group known as EXCOMM met to weigh different options for how to react. They considered multiple approaches before deciding what to do next.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff all agreed that launching a full military strike and invading Cuba was the only way to deal with the situation. They were confident the Soviets would not try to stop the United States from taking over the island. But President Kennedy had his doubts about that approach.
They cannot stand by while we remove their missiles, cause the deaths of many Russians, and then do nothing at all. After all their public words, they certainly won’t allow that to happen. If they fail to act in Cuba, they will surely act in Berlin.
Kennedy believed that if the U.S. launched an air attack on Cuba, the Soviets would interpret this as a direct challenge, possibly leading them to take aggressive action in Berlin. He also feared that other American allies would view the United States as reckless and impulsive—people who had failed to handle the Cuban issue diplomatically and had lost Berlin in the process.
EXCOMM weighed how the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba might shift the strategic balance between the two superpowers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that having those missiles would seriously change the military equation. But McNamara disagreed, saying that adding about forty more warheads wouldn't make much of a difference. At the time, the U.S. already had around five thousand strategic warheads, while the Soviet Union had only three hundred. So even if they now had three hundred and forty, he concluded it wouldn’t substantially alter the overall balance. In 1990, he reiterated that view, saying, “It made no difference.... The military balance wasn't changed. I didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now.”
Kennedy had made a promise to the American people, just weeks prior to the crisis, that if Cuba ever gained the ability to launch offensive actions against the United States, the United States would respond. The presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba would have shifted the political balance, and Kennedy later explained that “it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality.” The credibility of the United States among its allies and its own people would also have suffered if the Soviet Union seemed to fix the strategic imbalance by placing missiles there.
On 18 October 1962, Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko said the missiles were meant for defense only. Kennedy chose not to say what he already knew, avoiding any public panic. He did not tell the American people that he was already aware of the missile sites.
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Kennedy spent the morning of October 21 consulting with members of EXCOMM and other top advisers, weighing his choices carefully. The two remaining options were an air strike aimed mainly at Cuba’s missile sites or a naval blockade of the island. A full-scale invasion wasn’t being considered first. McNamara backed the blockade, seeing it as a strong but limited military move that kept the U.S. in control. Still, the word "blockade" caused legal trouble—under international law, it counted as an act of war. The Kennedy team believed the Soviets wouldn’t be provoked into attacking over a blockade alone. State and Justice Department experts said they might avoid declaring war by using the Rio Treaty, which allowed defense of the Western Hemisphere, if the Organization of American States voted unanimously to support it.
Admiral George Anderson, who was Chief of Naval Operations, prepared a position paper that helped Kennedy distinguish between what they called a "quarantine" of offensive weapons and a full blockade of all materials. Anderson made clear that a traditional blockade wasn't the original intent. Because the action would occur in international waters, Kennedy secured approval from the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defense provisions of the Rio Treaty.
By November 2, Venezuelan forces were ready for sea, including two destroyers and a submarine named Caribe, all reporting to the US Commander South Atlantic. Argentina contributed two destroyers and an Argentine submarine, with a Marine battalion and lift also on standby. The government of Trinidad and Tobago offered Chaguaramas Naval Base for use by any OAS nation during the quarantine. The Dominican Republic provided one escort ship, and Colombia was preparing to send military units, having already sent officers to discuss assistance. Additionally, the Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft beyond their existing commitments to the operation.
The plan started with a naval blockade meant to halt offensive weapons, using support from the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. It included watching Cuba closely and had the potential to block all goods and air transport. The CNO's approach was closely followed when the "quarantine" was carried out later.
On 19 October, the EXCOMM split into separate working groups to look at the options of an air strike or a blockade. By the afternoon, most members of the EXCOMM had moved toward supporting the blockade. Still, concerns lingered as late as 21 October. The main worry was that once the blockade began, the Soviets might rush to finish installing missiles. That could leave the U.S. in a position where it would have to bomb missiles already in operation, if the blockade hadn’t already forced their removal.
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On 22 October 1962, at 3:00 pm EDT, President Kennedy formed the executive committee, EXCOMM, through NSAM 196. That afternoon he met with Congressional leaders who opposed a blockade and demanded a tougher response. In Moscow, Ambassador Foy D. Kohler informed Khrushchev about the impending blockade and Kennedy’s speech to the nation. US ambassadors notified non-Eastern Bloc leaders worldwide. Before the address, delegations briefings were given to Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, French President Charles de Gaulle, and Organization of American States Secretary-General José Antonio Mora—all of whom supported the US stance. During the crisis, Kennedy had daily telephone conversations with Macmillan, who publicly backed US actions.
Shortly before delivering his speech to the nation, Kennedy called on former President Dwight Eisenhower. The two men had been talking closely throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, sharing thoughts on how Soviet leader Khrushchev might react. They believed he would respond in a way similar to how he acted during the Suez Crisis, and there was concern that he might try to use Berlin as part of a larger negotiation.
At 7:00 pm EDT on October 22nd, Kennedy spoke directly to the nation via television, addressing all major networks. He made known the recent discovery of Soviet missiles. The speech was delivered during a time of intense global tension. He outlined what had been found and what it meant for the country. His words were intended to inform and reassure the American people. The address came at a critical moment in world history. It marked a pivotal point in the unfolding crisis. Kennedy’s message was clear, urgent, and necessary. He communicated directly with citizens across the nation. This televised statement was part of a larger effort to manage the situation. The missiles had been placed secretly on Cuban soil. Their presence changed everything. The nation watched and listened. The speech was not just a report — it was a moment of leadership in crisis. It signaled the start of a tense period known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The United States made it clear that if the Soviet Union used missiles based in Cuba to strike any country in the Western Hemisphere, it would be seen as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States itself. That kind of action would trigger a full retaliatory response against the Soviet Union.
To stop this growing threat, a strict blockade is being put in place around Cuba. All ships heading there, no matter their origin or port, will be checked. If they carry weapons, they will be turned back. This quarantine will continue if needed, and may expand to other kinds of cargo or transportation. At this time, basic supplies like food and medicine are not being blocked, unlike what the Soviets did during their Berlin blockade in 1948.
Kennedy's speech that day sent a clear message to the world, and in its wake, orders went out to every U.S. military unit across the globe, moving them into DEFCON 3 status. The Navy responded with the heavy cruiser USS Newport News as the flagship for the naval quarantine around Cuba, accompanied by the destroyer USS Leary. That speech, delivered to the nation, was later called by Kennedy’s speechwriter Ted Sorensen “Kennedy's most important speech historically, in terms of its impact on our planet.”
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In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan stood with Kennedy during the crisis. The British ambassador to the United States, David Ormsby-Gore, had a close personal relationship with the Kennedy family and took part in discussions at the White House about how to manage the situation.
In West Germany, newspapers backed the U.S. response by pointing out how weak America had been in the region during previous months. They also showed concern that the Soviets might strike back in Berlin. The West German government stood behind the blockade.
In France, on October 23rd, the crisis dominated the front pages of all daily newspapers. The following day, an editorial in Le Monde questioned whether the CIA’s photographic evidence was genuine. Two days later, after a high-ranking CIA agent visited the country, the newspaper agreed the photos were valid. French President Charles de Gaulle stood firmly behind Kennedy, but he also saw the situation as proof of Europe’s weakness in the face of superpower tension.
On 24 October, Pope John XXIII reached out to the Soviet embassy in Rome with a message meant for the Kremlin. He voiced his deep concern for peace and asked all governments to heed the cry of humanity. In his words, he urged them to do all that was in their power to save peace.
Kennedy’s speech triggered a response from across the world. Just days later, the Chinese People's Daily declared that 650 million Chinese citizens supported the Cuban people. This announcement came as the crisis deepened, occurring at the same time as conflict between China and India. During this period, China launched a surprise attack on India along the Himalayan border.
The Organization of American States showed support for the United States' naval quarantine effort, while also denouncing the Soviet Union's growing missile presence in Cuba. The group went further by agreeing on actions intended to stop additional offensive weapons from being sent to the island.
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On 25 October, the United States called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin about the missiles, but Zorin refused to answer. The next evening at 10:00 pm EDT, the U.S. raised the readiness level of Strategic Air Command forces to DEFCON 2. For the first and only time in history, B-52 bombers were placed on continuous airborne alert. Some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles, including those targeting Cuba, were put on alert. The Air Defense Command quickly redeployed 161 nuclear-armed interceptors, with one-third on 15-minute alert. Twenty-three nuclear-armed B-52s were sent to orbit points near the Soviet Union to show resolve. Jack J. Catton later estimated that about 80 percent of SAC’s planes were ready for launch during the crisis.
At the height of the crisis, the United States realized the Soviet Union had completely frozen in place. There were no increases in alert status, no additional flights, no strengthening of air defenses. They made no moves at all. It was during this moment that humanity stood closest to nuclear war—never closer than in Cuba.
By 22 October, the Tactical Air Command had 511 fighters and supporting aircraft on one-hour alert over Cuba. The Military Air Transport Service and TAC were struggling with command and support issues. There weren’t enough personnel in security, armaments, or communications to handle the concentration of aircraft in Florida. TAC couldn’t use war-reserve munitions, so they had to gather supplies by other means. Without enough airlift capacity for a large-scale airborne operation, 24 reserve squadrons were called up.
At 1:45 am EDT on 25 October, Kennedy answered Khrushchev’s telegram. He said the U.S. had no choice but to act after being told many times that Cuba would not host offensive missiles. The placement of those missiles, he stated, “required the responses I have announced.” Kennedy expressed hope that Khrushchev’s government would take steps to return things to how they were before.
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The next morning, October 26th, Kennedy told EXCOMM he thought only an invasion could get the missiles out of Cuba. He was talked into waiting and keeping up both military and diplomatic pressure. He agreed and said to boost the low-level flights over the island from two a day to one every two hours. He also ordered a fast-track plan to set up a new civil government in Cuba, just in case an invasion moved forward.
At this point in the crisis, it seemed like neither side would give in. The Soviets had made it clear through public and private messages that they weren’t going to back down, and the United States had no reason to doubt them. The U.S. was still getting ready to invade Cuba and, if necessary, launch a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. Kennedy wasn’t hiding these plans, and with Cuban and Soviet spies present, Khrushchev was made aware of what the U.S. was preparing.
During the final days of October 1962, as the world held its breath, the United States used the threat of air strikes and invasion to push the Soviet Union toward a deal. The possibility of military action helped shape Khrushchev’s response, and his messages grew more uncertain. Dean Rusk observed that Khrushchev "blinked," showing signs of panic as the situation escalated. The Soviets struggled with clarity in their communications, which gave the U.S. an edge in negotiations. Meanwhile, top Soviet leaders failed to acknowledge that only Castro could agree to inspections, and they kept making plans for Cuba without telling him. These missteps deepened the impression that the USSR was losing control of the crisis.
The situation continued to grow more intense, and this affected other parts of the Cold War. Khrushchev had been considering a Warsaw Pact invasion of Albania, a plan that was being discussed in the Eastern Bloc after the Vlora incident. That incident had happened the year before, and now, with tensions rising, those plans were dropped. The crisis was expanding beyond just the United States and the Soviet Union.
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At 1:00 pm EDT on October 26, John A. Scali of ABC News met with Aleksandr Fomin, whose real name was Alexander Feklisov, the KGB chief in Washington. Fomin, acting on orders from the Politburo of the CPSU, told Scali, “War seems about to break out.” He asked Scali to use his contacts to reach high-level people at the State Department to see if the U.S. might be open to a diplomatic solution. Fomin suggested that the agreement include a Soviet promise to remove the missiles under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly say he would not accept such weapons again, in exchange for a U.S. statement saying it would not invade Cuba. The U.S. responded by having Brazil pass a message to Castro that an invasion was “unlikely” if the missiles were removed.
At 6:00 pm EDT on 26 October, the State Department began receiving a message that seemed to come directly from Khrushchev. It was Saturday morning in Moscow, 2:00 am. The letter was long, and it took several minutes to arrive. Translators then needed time to translate and transcribe what they had received.
Robert F. Kennedy called the letter "very long and emotional." Khrushchev had already laid out his proposal earlier that day to Scali: "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear." At 6:45 pm EDT, word reached the Americans of Fomin’s offer to Scali — seen as a setup for what was soon to come. The letter was accepted as official and accurate, though it later became clear that Fomin likely acted without authorization. The president’s team continued reviewing it deep into the night.
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The threat of nuclear war hung over the world as the crisis deepened. Castro believed an invasion of Cuba was about to happen, and on October 26 he sent a message to Khrushchev that seemed to ask for a nuclear strike against the U.S. if attacked. In a 2010 interview, Castro said he regretted that position, calling it not worth it after everything he had seen. He also ordered Cuban anti-aircraft weapons to shoot down any American planes, changing the rule from firing only at groups of two or more. By 6 a.m. EDT on October 27, the CIA reported that three of four missile sites in San Cristobal and both at Sagua la Grande were fully operational. The Cuban military was preparing for action but had been told not to respond unless attacked.
At 9:00 am EDT on 27 October, Radio Moscow broadcast a message from Khrushchev offering to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba if the United States agreed to dismantle its Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. The next hour brought another executive committee meeting where they concluded Khrushchev's shift reflected internal Kremlin debate. Kennedy realized accepting this proposal would leave him in an "insupportable position," since the missiles in Turkey were already slated for removal and the trade would look fair at the United Nations. Bundy added that Khrushchev's public agreement couldn't be trusted, noting, "The current threat to peace is not in Turkey, it is in Cuba." McNamara pointed out another Soviet tanker, the Grozny, was approaching within 600 miles and should be intercepted. He also suggested informing the Soviets about the blockade line through U Thant at the United Nations.
While the meeting continued, at 11:03 am EDT a new message came from Khrushchev. The message said, in part: "You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety-nine miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But... you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us." Khrushchev proposed that the Soviet Union would remove the missiles from Cuba. In return, the U.S. would declare it would remove its missiles from Turkey. Then, people entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect to make sure both sides kept their promises.
During the crisis, Italy's Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani proposed removing Jupiter missiles from Apulia as a negotiation tactic, passing this message through RAI-TV general manager Ettore Bernabei, who was in New York for a satellite broadcasting conference. On Saturday, October 27, Major Rudolf Anderson flew his sixth U-2F Dragon Lady mission over Cuba from McCoy Air Force Base in Florida. Around noon EDT, his plane was shot down by an S-75 Dvina surface-to-air missile near Banes, ordered by Soviet generals Leonid Garbuz and Stepan Grechko stationed in Havana who acted without approval from Army General Issa Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces in Cuba during Operation Anadyr. Anderson died in the crash. Later that day, at about 3:41 pm EDT, several Navy RF-8A Crusader aircraft conducting low-level reconnaissance were fired upon.
At 4:00 pm EDT on 27 October 1962, Kennedy summoned EXCOMM and directed that a message be sent to U Thant asking Soviets to halt missile construction during negotiations. General Maxwell Taylor reported that the U-2 had been shot down. Earlier, Kennedy had said he would attack such sites if fired upon, but decided not to act unless another incident occurred. That same day, Khrushchev told his son Sergei the U-2's destruction was carried out by "the Cuban military at the direction of Raúl Castro." The following day, Bobby Kennedy spoke with the Soviet Ambassador, saying that President Kennedy faced pressure from the military and that "an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will" because "the president is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power." He asked Khrushchev to agree to Kennedy's proposal.
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On Saturday evening, 27 October, emissaries from both Kennedy and Khrushchev met at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in Washington, DC’s Cleveland Park neighborhood. Kennedy proposed accepting Khrushchev’s offer to exchange missiles, a plan that surprised most of EXCOMM. Unknown to them, Robert Kennedy had been secretly meeting with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to assess the sincerity of the Soviets’ intentions. Still, the EXCOMM opposed the idea, fearing it would weaken NATO, and the Turkish government had also rejected any such deal.
As the meeting went on, a new plan began to take shape, and Kennedy started to come around to it. The idea was for him to set aside the latest message and go back to Khrushchev’s earlier offer instead. Kennedy at first hesitated, thinking Khrushchev might not accept the deal now that a new one had been proposed. But Llewellyn Thompson argued it could still work. White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen, along with Robert Kennedy, left the room and came back forty-five minutes later with a draft letter outlining this approach. The President made some changes, had it typed up, and sent it off.
After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller group stayed on in the Oval Office. They discussed adding an oral message to Dobrynin that made clear if the missiles weren’t withdrawn, military action would be taken. Rusk suggested one change: the deal’s language wouldn’t mention Turkey, though there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed “voluntarily” afterward. The president agreed, and the message was sent.
At Rusk's request, Fomin and Scali met again to discuss the conflicting messages from Khrushchev. Scali questioned why the two letters were so different, and Fomin attributed it to "poor communications." Scali dismissed that explanation, shouting he believed it was a "stinking double cross." He insisted an invasion was imminent, just hours away. Fomin said Khrushchev’s response to the U.S. message was expected soon and urged Scali to assure the State Department no treachery was intended. Though Scali doubted anyone would believe him, he agreed to pass along the message. After parting ways, Scali quickly drafted a memo for EXCOMM.
Within the US establishment, it was clear that rejecting the second offer and going back to the first would trap Khrushchev in a difficult spot. Military preparations were still moving forward, with all active duty Air Force personnel recalled to their bases in case of action. Robert Kennedy later described the mood: "We had not abandoned all hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours. It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday [30 October], and possibly tomorrow [29 October]."
At 8:05 pm EDT, a letter written earlier that day was sent out. It outlined the main points of an agreement, saying that Cuba would remove its weapons under UN supervision and stop new ones from entering. In return, the U.S. promised to lift the quarantine and guarantee Cuba wouldn’t be invaded. The letter was also given directly to the press so it couldn’t be delayed. A deal was now on the table, though Robert Kennedy doubted it would be accepted. That same evening, at 9:00 pm EDT, EXCOMM met again. They reviewed plans for the day ahead, including air strikes on missile sites and oil facilities. McNamara said they needed to prepare both a new government for Cuba and a response if the Soviets acted in Europe.
At 12:12 am EDT, on 27 October, the United States told its NATO allies that "the situation is growing shorter.... the United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary." The tension escalated when the CIA reported at 6:00 am that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.
On 27 October, Khrushchev received a letter from Castro known now as the Armageddon Letter. It was dated the day before, and in it Castro urged the use of nuclear force if Cuba were attacked. "I believe the imperialists' aggressiveness is extremely dangerous," he wrote, "and if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be."
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On Saturday, 27 October, after extended discussions, Kennedy made a secret deal to remove missiles from Turkey—and possibly from southern Italy—in return for Khrushchev pulling all missiles from Cuba. Whether the removal from Italy was part of that agreement remains disputed. Khrushchev claimed it was in his memoirs, and McNamara later gave the order to dismantle the missiles in both places. At the time, Khrushchev held crucial information the U.S. did not: a Soviet missile had shot down a U-2 plane against orders from Moscow, and Cuban defenses had fired on other reconnaissance aircraft without authorization from Khrushchev to Castro. He also knew the Soviets had 162 nuclear warheads in Cuba that the U.S. was unaware of, and that islanders would likely use them if invaded—even though Castro believed everyone in Cuba would perish. Khrushchev may not have considered it, but he also knew submarines nearby carried nuclear weapons the U.S. Navy might not have known about.
On 28 October 1962, at 9:00 am EST, Soviet leader Khrushchev broadcast his acceptance of President Kennedy's terms over Radio Moscow, ending the crisis without consulting the Politburo. In that statement, he ordered the dismantling of the missiles in Cuba described as "offensive." Kennedy learned of this solution at 10:00 am the same day. The agreement called for the removal of 15 Jupiters from Turkey by the U.S., and the Soviet Union would withdraw its missiles from Cuba. Though many of Kennedy's senior advisers opposed the deal, he accepted it. "This is a pretty good play of his," Kennedy said, according to a secretly recorded Cabinet Room meeting. He had placed the Jupiters in March 1962, provoking Khrushchev's anger. Vice President Lyndon Johnson was the first to support the missile swap, but others remained hesitant. Finally, Kennedy concluded the debate with a remark: "We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil and blood, when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles on Turkey. If that's part of the record, then you don't have a very good war."
Kennedy responded quickly to Khrushchev’s letter, calling it “an important and constructive contribution to peace.” In a formal reply, he said he viewed the exchange as firm commitments from both governments that needed to be acted on right away. He announced that the United States would speak in the Security Council about Cuba, pledging to respect Cuban borders and sovereignty. The U.S. promised not to interfere in Cuba’s internal affairs, not to allow its territory to be used for an invasion of Cuba, and to stop anyone planning aggression against Cuba—whether from American soil or from neighboring countries.
Kennedy shared details from a memorandum by his adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in which he outlined a "Post Mortem on Cuba." On 28 October, he spoke by phone with former presidents Eisenhower and Truman. He said he believed the crisis would leave the two superpowers facing off in Berlin by the end of November. Kennedy also expressed concern that the Soviet failure in Cuba would make their position there more difficult. He told his predecessors he had turned down a public Soviet proposal to remove troops from Cuba if the U.S. removed missiles from Turkey.
The US kept up the blockade of Cuba while aerial photos showed the Soviets removing missile systems. The 42 missiles and their equipment were loaded onto eight Soviet ships, which left Cuba between November 5 and 9. On November 2, Kennedy told the nation via radio and television about the dismantling of the R-12 missile bases in the Caribbean. Further diplomacy was needed to remove the Soviet Il-28 bombers, which were loaded onto three ships on December 5 and 6. At the same time, the US announced the end of the blockade at 6:45 pm EST on November 20, 1962. But even as the Kennedy administration thought the crisis was over, nuclear tactical rockets remained in Cuba—not part of the agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and unknown to the Americans.
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After the crisis, Khrushchev reached out to President Kennedy with a proposal aimed at reducing tensions between their nations. In a letter dated 30 October 1962, he suggested several measures meant to prevent another nuclear standoff. These included a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, possibly even dissolving those military alliances; a treaty to stop all nuclear testing and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons altogether; a resolution of the Germany issue by both sides accepting the existence of West and East Germany; and U.S. recognition of mainland China’s government. Khrushchev invited Kennedy to respond with counter-proposals and continue discussions through peaceful means. He also asked Norman Cousins, editor of a major American magazine and an anti-nuclear activist, to act as a liaison. Cousins met with Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962.
Kennedy responded cautiously to Khrushchev’s offers, telling Cousins he had to take them seriously due to pushback from强硬派 in his own government. After the crisis, both nations moved toward lessening tensions. They signed an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, called the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The two countries also set up a direct phone line between Moscow and Washington, known as the Moscow–Washington hotline, so their leaders could talk instantly if another emergency arose.
Khrushchev felt embarrassed by the outcome of the crisis, not just for himself but for the entire Soviet Union. The agreement to withdraw U.S. missiles from Italy and Turkey had been a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and now it was public knowledge. Khrushchev had approached Kennedy because he believed the situation was spiraling out of control, but instead of being seen as a peacemaker, the Soviets were perceived as backing down from a confrontation they had initiated. This retreat came at a cost — the Soviet leadership appeared to have lost face in front of its allies and enemies alike.
According to Dobrynin, the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation". Khrushchev's fall from power was partly because of the Soviet Politburo's embarrassment at his eventual concessions to the US and his ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place.
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On 20 November 1962, the United States lowered its nuclear alert status from DEFCON 3 back to DEFCON 4. General Curtis LeMay told Kennedy that the way the crisis ended was "the greatest defeat in our history." He had pushed for an immediate invasion of Cuba as soon as the situation began, and even after the Soviets withdrew their missiles, he still supported invading the island. Twenty-five years later, LeMay maintained that "We could have gotten not only the missiles out of Cuba, we could have gotten the Communists out of Cuba at that time."
By 1962, President Kennedy had already dealt with four major crises: the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, negotiations in Laos between the pro-Western government and the Pathet Lao communist movement, the Berlin Wall going up, and now the Cuban Missile Crisis. He knew that another failure to control communist expansion would hurt America’s reputation badly. Kennedy was determined to make his power believable, especially in Vietnam, where he saw a key test. Immediately after his summit meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, he told James Reston of The New York Times, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place."
In 1963 and 1964, at least four contingency strikes were launched from Florida toward Cuban airfields and suspected missile sites, but all were redirected to the Pinecastle Range Complex after the planes passed Andros island. Critics such as Seymour Melman and Seymour Hersh claimed the crisis encouraged the United States to turn to military force, a pattern later seen in the Vietnam War. Lorraine Bayard de Volo observed that the Cuban Missile Crisis set a standard of masculine brinkmanship by which future presidents would be measured. The actions taken in 1962 had lasting effects on how leaders approached foreign policy, shaping choices made by President Lyndon B. Johnson three years later.
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The most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis wasn’t recognized until a 2002 conference in Havana marking the 40th anniversary. That three-day meeting was sponsored by the National Security Archive, Brown University, and the Cuban government, and brought together many of the crisis’s veterans. There, they learned that on October 27, 1962, eleven U.S. Navy destroyers and the aircraft carrier USS Randolph found a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine, the B-59, near Cuba. Though it was in international waters, the Americans began dropping practice depth charges to force it to surface.
The Soviet submarine B-59 had been submerged too deep to pick up radio signals from Moscow, leaving the crew in darkness about whether war had erupted. Captain Valentin Savitsky did not know the depth charges circling the vessel were harmless practice rounds meant only to compel it to surface. With oxygen running low and surrounded by American ships, the crew had no choice but to rise. As the submarine ascended, it was targeted by machine-gun fire from U.S. ASW S-2 Tracker aircraft flying just meters above. The rounds struck near the hull or bow, adding to the tension as surface vessels closed in. The intense pressure and lack of communication led Savitsky to believe World War III had already begun. Unaware that the B-59 carried a 15-kiloton nuclear torpedo—similar in power to the Hiroshima bomb—the Americans continued their assault. The USS Beale was joined by other destroyers, pummeling the submerged vessel with explosives.
In the heat of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a tense standoff unfolded aboard the Soviet submarine B-59. Captain Savitsky ordered the preparation of a nuclear torpedo, targeting the USS Randolph, an aircraft carrier leading the naval task force. Three senior officers debated in the cramped control room: Savitsky, political officer Ivan Semyonovich Maslennikov, and Deputy brigade commander Vasily Arkhipov, equivalent to a U.S. Navy Commander. Accounts vary on whether Arkhipov convinced Savitsky not to launch or if Savitsky himself decided coming to the surface was the only reasonable option. The decision required unanimous consent from all three. Arkhipov alone refused to agree. His reputation factored heavily in the debate; the previous year, he had exposed himself to severe radiation to save a submarine with a failing nuclear reactor.
During the conference in October 2002, McNamara said that nuclear war had come much closer than people realized. Thomas Blanton, who is the director of the National Security Archive, mentioned a man named Vasily Arkhipov. Blanton said, "A guy called Vasily Arkhipov saved the world."
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In 1992, it was revealed that Soviet troops stationed in Cuba had already been equipped with tactical nuclear warheads meant for artillery rockets and Il-28 bombers by the time the crisis erupted. Castro later said he would have supported using those weapons if the United States had launched an invasion, even at the cost of Cuba’s destruction.
Fifty years ago, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. During the standoff, US President John F. Kennedy thought the chance of escalation to war was "between 1 in 3 and even". We now know that in addition to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union had deployed 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba, and the local Soviet commander there could have launched these weapons without additional codes or commands from Moscow. The US air strike and invasion scheduled for the third week of the confrontation would likely have triggered a nuclear response against American ships and troops, and perhaps even Miami. The resulting war might have led to the deaths of over 100 million Americans and over 100 million Russians.
BBC journalist Joe Matthews published a story on 13 October 2012, following up on remarks made by Graham Allison about 100 tactical nuclear warheads. These weapons had been shipped to Cuba with long-range missiles but were not noticed by U.S. intelligence. Khrushchev worried that Fidel Castro’s pride and anger over the concessions Kennedy had demanded might break the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. To prevent that, Khrushchev decided to give Cuba more than 100 of these tactical nuclear weapons. He judged that since the Americans hadn’t included the missiles in their list of demands, keeping them in Cuba would serve Soviet interests.
Anastas Mikoyan went to Havana to talk with Fidel Castro about the missile deal, trying to keep the Soviet Union and Cuba on good terms. During his visit, Mikoyan saw how paranoid Castro was, believing Moscow had made a secret agreement with the United States that left Cuba defenseless. On his own, Mikoyan decided that Castro and his military must not be allowed to control nuclear weapons as powerful as 100 Hiroshima bombs. He managed to calm the situation on November 22, 1962, during a tense four-hour meeting. Mikoyan told Castro that transferring the missiles permanently into Cuban hands would break an unpublished Soviet law—though it didn’t actually exist. Reluctantly, Castro agreed. The tactical nuclear weapons were then packed up and sent back to the Soviet Union by sea in December 1962.
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